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What Is Shared in the Sharing Economy?
Ethics and Externalities in Public-Private Partnerships
Nicholas Browning, Ph.D. *
INTRODUCTION 1
Though George Orwell is among my favorite writers, I have not found his
recent resurgence in popularity particularly comforting. 2 Whenever 1984 is
“chiming with people,” it should give us all pause. 3 Newspeak concepts have an
eerie relevance in our age of alternative facts (think double-speak/double-talk) and
gaslighted, partisan filter bubbles (or doublethink). 4 Meanwhile, the slow, pervasive
creep of Silicon Valley, fueled by our collective, consistent willingness to trade
information for convenience—or simply access to platforms—oozes with overtures to
Big Brother. We have allowed, and arguably empowered, tech giants to watch over
us with too little concern for erosions of our privacy and Fourth Amendment rights. 5
There are, however, moments of punctuated concern over the government’s
ability to access our data; for example, the tight Senate vote in May 2020 that
allowed for continued, warrantless governmental collection of Americans’ browser
histories drew intense criticisms. 6 Interestingly, much of the public vitriol was
aimed at the government’s right to access the information, with few people
questioning the potential harm done by the companies that collect that
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Nicholas Browning (Ph.D., University of Georgia) is an Assistant Professor of Public Relations in The Media
School at Indiana University-Bloomington. His primary research interests are communication ethics,
corporate social responsibility, and political public relations.
In February 2020, the Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality hosted its annual symposium in
Bloomington, Indiana. This year’s theme was Social Equality in the “Sharing” Economy? This article is a
reflection on and outgrowth of the session, “From Digital to Physical: The Reality of the Sharing Economy of
Communities,” for which I was a panelist. Other panelists included Daniel Bingham, community organizer
and climate justice activist; Mike McAfee, executive director of Visit Bloomington; and Beth Rosenbarger,
planning services manager for the Bloomington Department of Planning and Transportation. For the full
session, see IU Maurer, IJLSE Symposium Spring 2020 from Digital to Physical, YOUTUBE (Feb. 25, 2020),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m2Y6trlg7u0.
Kimiko de Freytas-Tamura, George Orwell’s ‘1984’ Is Suddenly a Best-Seller, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/25/books/1984-george-orwell-donald-trump.html.
Id.
GEORGE ORWELL, 1984, at 44–45 (Rosetta Books 2000) (1949) (ebook); Double-talk, double talk , OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989), www.oed.com/view/Entry/57061 (“[D]eliberately ambiguous or imprecise
language; used esp. of political language that is subject to arbitrary national or party interpretation.”).
See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 473 (1928) (5–4 decision) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting) (warning that as advancements in technology become available to the government, it can use
the technology to slowly encroach on individual privacy rights).
Trevor Timm, Opinion, The US Senate Voted to Let Trump Spy on Your Search History. But All Is Not Lost,
GUARDIAN (May 16, 2020, 6:20 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/may/16/us-senatecongress-privacy-bill-search-history; Patricia Zengerle, U.S. Senate Blocks Bid to Curb Surveillance of
Americans’ Internet Habits, REUTERS (May 13, 2020, 6:24 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usasurveillance-congress/u-s-senate-blocks-bid-to-curb-surveillance-of-americans-internet-habitsidUSKBN22P3C1.
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information—or, indeed, whether the collection and storage of seemingly
unquantifiable amounts of data lead to net societal gain. 7
Data mining is one of many pivotal ways in which established tech
companies, as well as more recent start-ups, fundamentally alter individual lives,
communal ties, corporate strategies, government policies, international affairs, and
the myriad of relationships all these individuals and entities have with one
another. 8 The analogy of 1984 breaks down somewhat here, especially when we
consider the economic consequences of these advances—even more so when focusing
on the so-called “sharing” or “gig” economy that has emerged in the last decade or
so.
Animal Farm, another Orwell masterpiece, more accurately captures the
economic slight-of-hand potentially at play here. Orwell’s biting satire of the
totalitarian Soviet Union mocks the nature in which party leaders co-opted the
ideal that shared economic ownership would create social equality. In effect, strict
government control served to bolster a solidified caste system of inequality. The
linguistic turn in Animal Farm’s most famous line summarizes my more cynical
views of the sharing economy: “All animals are equal but some animals are more
equal than others.” 9
I. DEFINING THE SHARING ECONOMY
From my introductory remarks, the reader might view my reaction as
alarmist. In truth, I do not foresee a collapse of civilization into some Orwellian
dystopia based on the growth of Silicon Valley and the sharing economy, which
many of its companies fuel. That said, I remain pessimistic that the sharing
economy can deliver on its bolder promises. At the risk of appearing Luddite, I
worry that such “advances” will, on the whole, do more harm than good, particularly
in exacerbating inequalities. I believe the assessment of Eckhardt and colleagues
aptly highlights my concerns: “In theory, the sharing economy only democratizes
marketplaces, expands opportunities for small business and individuals, and
enables access to resources. . . . Despite these hopeful contentions, the question of
the value of the sharing economy to society is far from closed.” 10
To my mind, when we talk about the sharing economy’s value, we are asking
less a singular question and more a series of inquiries, the most prescient of those
being: What is shared? Among whom? And how is that sharing distributed and
governed?
Here, it is best to set up at least a working definition of a sharing economy.
Though various scholars and commentators have cited examples and developed
7
8
9
10

See Timm, supra note 6; Zengerle, supra note 6.
See, e.g., Brian Hubbard, What Is Media Intelligence and Why Does It Matter?, MEDIUM (Sept. 13, 2020),
https://medium.com/@xbhubbardx/what-is-media-intelligence-and-why-does-it-matter-b06f577486fa.
GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM 148 (Harcourt, Brace & Co. 1946) (1945).
Giana M. Eckhardt, Mark B. Houston, Baojun Jiang, Cait Lamberton, Aric Rindfleisch & Georgios Zervas,
Marketing in the Sharing Economy, J. MARKETING, Sept. 2019, at 5, 18–19.
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useful typologies, 11 none are absolute. That said, five defining characteristics of
entities operating in the sharing economy commonly appear in the literature. 12
1. Temporary rather than permanent access. While traditionally, individuals
have purchased products for permanent possession, the sharing economy
promises only temporary access to products. 13 For example, services such as
Zipcar only offer use rather than ownership of automobiles; members pay a
fee to register and share the supply of cars. 14
2. Access based on entity-to-entity value transfer. Colloquially, we think of
sharing as a kindness, or a favor of sorts. 15 While we may offer a ride to a
friend with no expectation of monetary gain, Uber drivers are willing to share
their vehicles with consumers only in exchange for payment, marking the
exchange economic rather than interpersonal. 16
3. Reliance on a facilitating platform. Individuals and entities in the sharing
economy usually depend on technological middlemen. Traditional car rental
or taxi services do not operate primarily in this manner, whereas carshare
and rideshare services rely on mobile applications to connect consumer and
provider. 17
4. Expanded roles for consumers. Consumers are traditionally defined solely by
the act of consumption, either of products or services. 18 In sharing economies,
consumers take on expanded roles. Zipcar, for instance, requires its members
to clean and prep cars for future users, which is typically the role of the
provider. 19 The line between production and consumption blurs in sharing
economies, hence the proliferation of “prosumers.” 20
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ARUN SUNDARARAJAN, THE SHARING ECONOMY: THE END OF EMPLOYMENT AND THE RISE OF CROWD-BASED
CAPITALISM 26−27 (2016). See generally Bernard Marr, The Sharing Economy – What It Is, Examples, and
How Big Data, Platforms and Algorithms Fuel It, FORBES (Oct. 21, 2016, 2:16 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2016/10/21/the-sharing-economy-what-it-is-examples-and-howbig-data-platforms-and-algorithms-fuel/#16b795817c5a.
Eckhardt et al. supra note 10, at 7. See generally JEREMY RIFKIN, THE AGE OF ACCESS (2000) (exploring the
implication of the networking economy on human interaction with the market); SUNDARARAJAN, supra note
11; Wolfgang Kathan, Kurt Matzler & Victoria Veider, The Sharing Economy: Your Business Model’s Friend
or Foe?, 59 BUS. HORIZONS 663, 665 (2016); Cait Poynor Lamberton & Randall L. Rose, When Is Ours Better
than Mine? A Framework for Understanding and Altering Participation in Commercial Sharing Systems, J.
MARKETING, July 2012, at 109 (examining multiple studies on the shared economy); Marr, supra note 11.
Fleura Bardhi & Giana M. Eckhardt, Liquid Consumption, 44 J. CONSUMER RES. 582, 585 (2017).
How It Works, ZIPCAR, https://www.zipcar.com/how-it-works (last visited Aug. 27, 2020).
Bardhi & Eckhardt, supra note 13.
See How to Use the Uber App, UBER, https://www.uber.com/us/en/about/how-does-uber-work/ (last visited
Aug. 27, 2020).
See Anne Sraders, Uber vs. Taxi: What’s the Difference?, THESTREET (Feb. 27, 2019, 11:15 AM),
https://www.thestreet.com/technology/uber-vs-taxi-14872678.
Bardhi & Eckhardt, supra note 13.
Rules of Vehicle Use, ZIPCAR, https://www.zipcar.com/apply/rules-of-vehicle-use (last visited Sept. 13, 2020).
Prosumer, n.1, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2007), http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/258773 (“A
consumer who . . . purchases component elements of products in order to build or administer his or her own
goods and services.”).
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5. Crowdsourced supply. Again, colloquially speaking, sharing implies limited
supply. 21 Even if I were inclined to offer endless rides to friends, temporal
and material restraints prevent me from doing so. Sharing economies scale
by employing large numbers of providers, such as the pool of Uber drivers,
which crowdsources supply to meet growing demand.
Two other features are common in sharing economies, though they are less
quintessential. First, the resources shared among peers are often provided by one of
the exchange parties. In the case of Uber, the driver typically owns the car rather
than Uber itself, 22 though for other entities in the sharing economy, such as Zipcar,
the shared product is owned by the company. 23 Second, sharing economies are often
dependent on a reputation system, such as the rating of Uber drivers and riders. 24
While common across the sharing economy, the reputational or rating aspect has
spread and formalized in more traditional sectors of the economy as well. 25
II. PROBLEMS FOR PROSUMERS
As we have seen, the sharing economy redefines traditional roles of
consumers and providers, such that, in certain scenarios, these roles overlap and
become one and the same. Poshmark, for instance, operates like a social networking
site that allows users to connect with others with similar tastes in fashion. 26 Within
these networks, people can sell and exchange clothing—or even attend “Posh
Parties” 27—to quickly update their respective wardrobes. 28 In such a setting,
consumer and producer are practically indistinguishable. However, the lines of
demarcation between these roles are cleaner for other entities in the sharing
economy, such as TaskRabbit. It allows users to sign up to complete specific jobs,
ranging from the relatively mundane (e.g., picking up groceries) to more specialized,
skilled labor (e.g., remodeling a bathroom). 29 In most of these interactions, the role
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Bardhi & Eckhardt, supra note 13, at 586.
See Here’s What You Need to Use the Driver App, UBER, https://www.uber.com/us/en/drive/ (last visited Sept.
13, 2020).
See What is Car Sharing?, ZIPCAR, https://www.zipcar.com/carsharing (last visited Sept. 13, 2020).
How to Use the Uber App, supra note 16.
See Eckhardt et al. supra note 10, at 7–8, 8 tbl.2.
See What is Poshmark, POSHMARK, https://poshmark.com/what_is_poshmark (last visited Oct. 17, 2020)
[https://web.archive.org/web/20201017224814/https://poshmark.com/what_is_poshmark] (“At Poshmark, we
focus on offering a one-of-a-kind experience in connecting people and their closets. Join us and be part of an
awesome community where we thrive on trust, respect, and a shared affinity for discovering fashion!”).
Posh Parties: The FAQs, POSHMARK (Aug. 1, 2014), https://blog.poshmark.com/2014/08/01/posh-parties-thefaqs/ (“Posh Parties are real-time virtual shopping events where fashion lovers . . . meet up in the
Poshmark app to shop, share, and sell clothing and accessories.”).
What is Poshmark, supra note 26.
Services Offered, TASKRABBIT, https://www.taskrabbit.com/services (last visited Aug. 26, 2020).
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of consumer and “tasker” are separated, as they would be in more traditional
economies. 30
What remains true of virtually every company operating in the sharing
economy is that each acts mostly—often exclusively—as a facilitator connecting
individuals within networks. The decentralized nature of such economies presents a
host of challenges for virtually every stakeholder in the sharing economy, only some
of which I will touch upon here. Given their interconnections as stakeholders, it
makes sense to begin with consumers and producers.
A. Consumers
Decentralization leads to inconsistent consumer experiences for a host of
reasons. The scale of sharing economies in terms of geography, as well as numbers
of consumers and providers, proves inherently inhibitive. 31 Indeed, “[b]ecause
platforms do not typically produce offerings, they cannot control quality or
guarantee consistency.” 32 Anecdotally, most people who have ever relied on Uber or
Lyft can relate at least one horror story in which the vehicle was not properly
cleaned or maintained, or the driver was distracted, reckless, or downright
disturbing in the conversational details he or she disclosed.
Rating systems are in place to provide companies feedback and regulatory
mechanisms, but they are notoriously unreliable. 33 While some have suggested the
anonymity of such platforms might lead to scathing reviews, 34 there is mounting
evidence that social pressure not to harm another’s livelihood actually leads users
to inflate ratings, meaning bad actors are underreported. 35 Compounding matters,
consumers are likely to associate a bad experience with the individual actor as
opposed to the platform, possibly viewing negative interactions as exceptions over
which companies have little control. 36 Because final judgment falls on the
individual provider rather than the collective platform, companies have little
incentive to weed out bad actors as the organizations themselves face minimal
threats of reputational damage or the loss of repeat customers.
Even when platforms produce or own shared offerings, quality control still
presents challenges. Again, what drives gentler ratings of providers is that
30
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See What Is TaskRabbit and How Does TaskRabbit Work? Let Us Scrutinize About It, NCRYPTED BLOG (July
7, 2020), https://www.ncrypted.net/blog/what-is-taskrabbit/ (last visited Oct. 13, 2020) (“TaskRabbit has two
different groups of people: one called Taskers – ones who offer the services and another Task-Givers – ones
who demand the services.”).
Eckhardt et al., supra note 10, at 17.
Id. at 10.
See generally RACHEL BOTSMAN, WHO CAN YOU TRUST?: HOW TECHNOLOGY BROUGHT US TOGETHER—AND
WHY IT MIGHT DRIVE US APART (2017) (exploring how institutional trust supports governance, economy, and
community as well as technology’s role in building and eroding that trust); Apostolos Filippas, John J.
Horton & Joseph M. Golden, Reputation Inflation 32–34 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 25857, 2019), https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w25857/w25857.pdf.
See BOTSMAN, supra note 33.
See Filippas et al., supra note 33.
See Eckhardt et al., supra note 10, at 15.
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consumers in the sharing economy often view providers as peers. 37 As a
consequence of this viewpoint, norms governing social decency are major drivers of
good behavior, which leads to rules of interpersonal interaction carrying over to the
economic exchanges within the sharing economy. 38 Seen as such, good behavior
from both consumers and providers are regulated by norms of reciprocity.
However, even the most optimistically minded would admit not everyone acts
responsibly or courteously. This truth limits platforms’ ability to control for quality
experiences as the behavior of one consumer often dictates the experience of
another. A Zipcar user may fail to properly clean and prepare the vehicle for the
consumer next in line, or the last operator of a Bird or Lime electric scooter 39 may
have damaged the scooter or parked it in an inconvenient or inaccessible location.
Some companies try to thwart such behavior by penalizing irresponsible consumers;
for instance, Lime’s user agreement stipulates, “[w]e may charge you up to $450 if
we are not able to retrieve any Product due to your actions.” 40 In Bloomington,
Indiana, where I live and work, I have seen scooters “parked” in streets, drainage
ditches, and even trees. Presumably, a penalty could apply in such cases. 41
Ironically, despite the interpersonal nature of many interactions within the
sharing economy, an element of community appears lacking. By community, I
reference two different contexts, the first being the more nuanced brand
community. 42 In more traditional economies, in which people purchase rather than
share offerings, consumers often develop connections with the companies and
brands they patronize—sometimes deeply enough that these purchase decisions
reflect or imbue a sense of identity. 43 That identification can be relatively simple;
certain brands signal attributes of their users, such as wealth or status. 44 Other
times, that identification is more value-laden: being loyal to a brand for its stance
on sociopolitical issues, using energy-efficient appliances, and patronizing locally
owned businesses signal users’ commitments to causes important to them. 45
37
38
39

40
41

42
43
44
45

See Filippas et al., supra note 33, at 5.
See generally JOHN W. THIBAUT & HAROLD H. KELLEY, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF GROUPS (1959).
Bird and Lime are both companies that operate dockless electric scooters which are shared between users
for a fee. See Lilly St. Angelo, Bird Scooters Land in Bloomington, IND. DAILY STUDENT (Sept. 14, 2018, 5:12
PM), https://www.idsnews.com/article/2018/09/bird-scooters-land-in-bloomington (“Bird scooters are electric
scooters designed to be ridden and parked wherever the rider desires. . . . Bird is one of many new
companies including Lime, Ofo and Pace using short-range vehicle sharing to solve the problem of ‘the last
mile.’”).
User Agreement, LIME, https://www.li.me/user-agreement (last updated Oct. 28, 2019).
The Lime user agreement goes further. If the company can demonstrate a user damaged an electric scooter,
it can charge the user a replacement fee—valued up to $1,500. Id. If the vehicle is deemed lost or
potentially stolen, Lime reserves the right to file police reports against the user. Id.
See generally Albert M. Muniz, Jr. & Thomas C. O’Guinn, Brand Community, 27 J. CONSUMER RES. 412
(2001).
Id. at 413.
Id. at 419.
See generally Nicholas Browning, Ejae Lee, Young Eun Park, Taeyoung Kim & Ryan Collins, Muting or
Meddling? Advocacy as a Relational Communication Strategy Affecting Organization–Public Relationships
and Stakeholder Response, 97 JOURNALISM & MASS COMM. Q. 1026, 1031 (2020) (exploring the relationship
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Just as individuals organize into groups based on hobbies or interests,
identifiable connection to a brand can serve as the impetus for communities to
emerge. These brand communities are active online and/or in person. HarleyDavidson and Jeep provide good examples of both: owners of the iconic motorcycles
and off-road vehicles can share information about modifying vehicles in online
forums or schedule in-person meetups for rides and excursions. Both HarleyDavidson and Jeep also host several events for avid fans. 46
Entertainment companies build similar communities relying on experiential
marketing tactics, which focuses not only on consumers’ rational desires for
functioning products but instead treats consumers as emotional creatures who
define themselves by memorable moments that may feature brands as focal
points. 47 From the world of Harry Potter to the ever-expanding properties of Disney,
companies have learned that the real value of the brand is less in the product or
service and more in the memorable emotional experiences people connect to these
brands. 48 Fostering that sense of connection naturally leads to avid fandom and the
emergence of communities formed around a brand or property. 49
These brand communities enrich the experiences of consumers beyond simple
economic exchanges, fostering meaningful social engagement while also
strengthening brand loyalty. However, in the sharing economy, in which consumers
merely access brands and products rather than own them, this sense of brand
community erodes, as do the benefits for both consumer and company. 50
The notion of community also applies in our more common understanding of
the term, as a meaningful social connection between proximate others. 51
Relationships between consumer and provider may begin from the necessity of
economic exchange but often blossom into more personal relationships—and
sometimes even friendships. Businesses reliant on repeat customers and referrals
such as barbershops, mechanics, and restaurants are archetypal of such

46
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51

between consumers and companies, as related to consumers' identity); C.B. Bhattacharya & Sankar Sen,
Consumer-Company Identification: A Framework for Understanding Consumers' Relationships with
Companies, J. MARKETING, Apr. 2003, at 76, 80 (same).
James H. McAlexander, John W. Schouten & Harold F. Koenig, Building Brand Community, J. MARKETING,
Jan. 2002, at 38, 40–41; see also Susan Fournier & Lara Lee, Getting Brand Communities Right, HARV. BUS.
REV., Apr. 2009, at 105, 111.
See BERND H. SCHMITT, EXPERIENTIAL MARKETING: HOW TO GET CUSTOMERS TO SENSE, FEEL, THINK, ACT, AND
RELATE TO YOUR COMPANY AND BRANDS 21–22 (1999).
See Allen Adamson, Disney Knows It’s Not Just Magic That Keeps a Brand on Top, FORBES (Oct. 15, 2014,
9:44 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/allenadamson/2014/10/15/disney-knows-its-not-just-magic-thatkeeps-a-brand-on-top/?sh=6f280c195b26; Sandra O’Loughlin, Six Experiential Marketing Lessons from
Harry Potter: The Exhibition, EVENT MARKETER (Dec. 8, 2017),
https://www.eventmarketer.com/article/experiential-insights-harry-potter-the-exhibition/.
While certain product and service categories more readily lend themselves to experiential marketing and
brand community initiatives, research demonstrates that the capacity to generate deeper emotional
connections at the heart of such endeavors is relatively widespread. See, e.g., Marc Fetscherin, Michèle
Boulanger, Cid Gonçalves Filho & Gustavo Quiroga Souki, The Effect of Product Category on Consumer
Brand Relationships, 23 J. PRODUCT & BRAND MGMT. 78, 84 (2014).
See Bardhi & Eckhardt, supra note 13, at 587–88.
See Community, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2009), www.oed.com/view/Entry/37337.

2021]

What Is Shared in the Sharing Economy?

25

connections. 52 The Bloomington Community Farmers’ Market presents a ready
personal example: over the past five years I have come to know almost every farmer
from whom I buy produce. The relationships that “regulars” foster with the
producers in traditional economies are largely absent in sharing economies because
“the matching algorithms and the sheer number of participants on both sides of a
sharing platform make it unlikely that a user would have enough repeated
interactions with one provider to establish a close interpersonal relationship.” 53
Sharing economies present broader and deeper challenges to communities
than just these immediate hurdles consumers face. I will address some of these
momentarily, but, for now, I must speak to concerns from the other major player in
economic exchanges: workers.
B. Workers
Though the sharing economy blurs the lines between consumer and producer,
provider, and worker, there are moments of separation. 54 As such, it is worth asking
how developments in, and the structure of, the sharing economy have altered our
conception of work and how that alteration ultimately affects workers.
Historically, the labor market has constantly been in flux, punctuated by
moments of great upheaval. The Industrial Revolution drastically transformed the
nature of work, globally as well as domestically, by pushing a largely rural people
and their agrarian economies toward urban centers of manufacturing and wage
labor. 55 Following the U.S. Civil War, the Gilded Age marked further centralization
of wealth and monopoly control of key industries, such as steel, oil, and railroads,
bringing with it countless abuses of poorer workers. 56
The push for protections sparked the labor movement beginning in the late
nineteenth century, and despite severe—and often violent, sometimes deadly—
corporate pushback, there were key victories. 57 Though arguably passed more out of
concern for preserving competition than aiding workers, the Sherman Antitrust Act
of 1890, 58 would eventually limit the power of monopolies and trusts, particularly

52
53
54
55
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See Eckhardt et al., supra note 10, at 15.
Id.
Id. at 9–10; Bardhi & Eckhardt, supra note 13, at 584.
Charles Hirschman & Elizabeth Mogford, Immigration and the American Industrial Revolution from 1880
to 1920, 38 SOC. SCI. RES. 897, 897 (2009); see also Jeffrey G. Williamson, Migrant Selectivity, Urbanization,
and Industrial Revolutions, 14 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 287, 312 (1988) (analyzing the demographic
composition of rural-urban immigration). For a more comprehensive analysis of the Industrial Revolution,
see PETER N. STEARNS, THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION IN WORLD HISTORY (1993).
See generally ALAN AXELROD, THE GILDED AGE: 1876-1912: OVERTURE TO THE AMERICAN CENTURY (2017);
RICHARD WHITE, THE REPUBLIC FOR WHICH IT STANDS: THE UNITED STATES DURING RECONSTRUCTION AND THE
GILDED AGE, 1865-1896 (2017).
Nicholas Browning, Ethics and the Profession: The Crystallizing of Public Relations Practice from
Association to Accreditation, 1936–1964, 35 AM. JOURNALISM 140, 157 (2018).
Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2018)).
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during President Theodore Roosevelt’s administration. 59 Additionally, President
Theodore Roosevelt’s intervention in the 1902 coal strike was praised as a major
step forward for labor unions. 60 Ultimately, it would be President Theodore
Roosevelt’s cousin, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, who delivered the most
sweeping victories for labor. New Deal reformers would secure passage of the
Wagner Act in 1935, which finally guaranteed the right of workers to unionize and
collectively bargain for fair wages and treatment. 61
Following the passage of the Wagner Act, many corporate leaders were
outraged, 62 but given the public’s general distrust of big business in the wake of the
Great Depression, early efforts at repealing or watering down the Wagner Act were
largely unsuccessful. 63 However, by the late 1940s and 1950s, oppositional forces
had secured passage of the Taft-Hartley and Landrum-Griffin Acts. 64 Together
these Acts banned closed union shops; paved the way for right-to-work laws; and
heavily regulated the internal affairs of unions, including financial and voting
practices. 65 By the 1960s, prominent figures, such as William F. Buckley Jr. and
Barry Goldwater, were advocating a retreat from Keynesian economic policy to the
classical liberalism of Friedrich Hayek. 66 As Thatcherism and Reaganomics took
hold in the 1970s and 1980s, neoliberalism became the de facto economic policy of
much of the Western world, leading to, among many things, a weakening of unions
and labor power. 67 In the United States, union membership peaked in the 1950s,
when roughly one-third of all laborers belonged to unions; 68 by 2019, that number
59

60
61
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63
64

65

66
67
68

See generally SUSAN BERFIELD, THE HOUR OF FATE: THEODORE ROOSEVELT, J. P. MORGAN, AND THE BATTLE TO
TRANSFORM AMERICAN CAPITALISM (2020); EDMUND MORRIS, THEODORE REX (2001).
See MORRIS, supra note 59, at 169.
National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§
151–169 (2018)). The National Labor Relations Act of 1935 is commonly known as the Wagner Act after its
drafter, Robert F. Wagner. See About NLRB, NAT’L LAB. REL. BOARD, https://www.nlrb.gov/about-nlrb/whowe-are/our-history/1935-passage-of-the-wagner-act (last visited Sept. 10, 2020).
Browning, supra note 57; Earl Harding, Member, Pub. Relations Comm., Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., The Right to
Work: We Are Now in the Hands of a Super-Government of Labor Organizations (June 28, 1941), in 7 VITAL
SPEECHES DAY 756, 757–59 (1941).
See Browning, supra note 57, at 157–58; Thomas Roy Jones, President, Am. Type Founders, Industry Looks
at Labor: Asleep Standing Up (Dec. 4, 1941), in 8 VITAL SPEECHES DAY 166 (1942).
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U.S.C. §§ 141–197 (2018)); Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act of 1959,
Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 401–531 (2018)). The Labor Management
Relations Act is commonly referred to as the Taft-Hartley Act, referring to Senator Robert A. Taft and
Congressman Fred. A. Hartley Jr., who introduced prior bills that were eventually incorporated into the
final Act. The latter Act is commonly referred to as the Landrum-Griffin Act for its sponsors, Senators
Phillip M. Landrum and Robert P. Griffin.
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https://www.dol.gov/general/aboutdol/history/dolchp05 (last visited Jan. 13, 2021).
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See generally id. at 251–65.
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had plummeted to six percent. 69 Currently, twenty-eight states—mostly southern
and midwestern, including Indiana—have passed some form of right-to-work laws, 70
further weakening union power. 71
I include this brief history of organized labor here because, in many ways, the
sharing economy serves to perpetuate the neoliberal ideal of worker autonomy.
While workers in the sharing economy may possess increased agency, 72 they are not
truly employees of sharing platforms; they operate more as freelancers or
contractors. 73
Almost without fail, sharing economy platforms tout the freedom such
autonomy brings to workers. The rideshare service Lyft asks prospective drivers:
“Want to be your own boss?” 74 Similarly, Uber plainly states: “You decide when and
how often you drive.” 75 As TaskRabbit guarantees its taskers, “Find local jobs that
fit your skills and schedule. With TaskRabbit, you have the freedom and support to
be your own boss.” 76 Airbnb allows owners and renters to host travelers in their
homes, promising that “You’re in full control of your availability, prices, house rules,
and how you interact with guests.” 77 JustPark offers people the chance to rent out
parking spaces ad hoc, assuring providers they can “choose when your space is
available to rent.” 78 Rover, a platform that connects pet owners with possible
sitters, tells prospective sitters, “Set your own schedule and prices[.] Offer any
combination of pet care services[.] Set size, age and other pet preferences that work
for you[.]” 79
Clearly, a major selling point of these platforms is the freedom and autonomy
of the worker. On the one hand, the offer is inherently appealing, particularly to the
entrepreneurial spirit woven tightly into the fabric of the American mythos. In fact,
most academics (myself included) would say that a sense of independence and
freedom within a workplace was a major driver in their choice to pursue the
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Union Members Summary, U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT., https://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm (last
updated Jan. 22, 2020).
E.g., Right-to-Work, IND. DEP’T LAB., https://www.in.gov/dol/2784.htm (last visited Oct. 13, 2020) (“The
Indiana Right-to-Work law provides that no employer, labor organization or any person may require an
individual to become or remain a member of a labor organization, or pay dues, fees or assessments (or
charitable donation substitutes) as a condition of employment, new or continued.”).
Stansbury & Summers, supra note 68, at 12.
The autonomy and flexibility of gig workers is highly debatable. Cf. Shelly Steward, Five Myths About the
Gig Economy, WASH. POST (Apr. 24, 2020, 12:09 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/fivemyths/five-myths-about-the-gig-economy/2020/04/24/852023e4-8577-11ea-ae26-989cfce1c7c7_story.html.
Eckhardt et al., supra note 10, at 11.
Become a Driver – Drive with Lyft, LYFT, https://www.lyft.com/driver (last visited Aug. 31, 2020).
Drive with Uber - Be Your Own Boss, UBER, https://www.uber.com/us/en/drive/ (last visited Aug. 31, 2020).
Register as a Tasker, TASKRABBIT, https://www.taskrabbit.com/become-a-tasker (last visited Aug. 31, 2020).
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visited Aug. 31, 2020).
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31, 2020).
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profession. 80 However, though university research faculty may operate in some
ways like contractors, we are very much employees of our respective institutions,
with all the security and benefits that come with such status. This is not the case
for many workers in the sharing economy, as “the individuals who provide sharing
services are often not classified as employees and generally lack traditional
employee benefits. Furthermore, as the sharing economy grows, providers
experience greater price and volume competition between platforms, which
threatens to reduce wages.” 81
For some sets of sharing economy workers, this lack of benefits may be a
minor problem—if it is a problem at all. For instance, a married person might be
covered by his or her spouse’s health insurance plan—though these individuals
would still lack access to retirement or other employment benefits. For many, a job
in the sharing economy may be a second or third source of income. 82 The sharing
economy is also commonly referred to as the gig economy, and these side gigs or
hustles may be a source of extra, rather than primary, income, in which a first job
carries with it benefits. 83
However, there are certainly some workers in the sharing economy for which
this gig is not so much a gig as a job. For them, a lack of benefits—particularly
health insurance and retirement planning—could wreak disastrous effects on their
lifetime earnings. 84 Moreover, the decentralized, contract-like nature of their work
may make it particularly difficult for gig workers to organize and leverage their
collective bargaining power, especially when new entrants are readily available to
join the market. 85 For example, studies have found that as few as four percent of
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See MAGGIE BERG & BARBARA K. SEEBER, THE SLOW PROFESSOR: CHALLENGING THE CULTURE OF SPEED IN THE
ACADEMY 17 (2016).
Eckhardt et al., supra note 10, at 19 (citations omitted).
Megan Cerullo, Nearly Half of Millennials Turn to Gig Economy to Earn More Cash, CBS NEWS (June 7,
2019, 2:12 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/side-hustle-jobs-american-workers-turn-to-gig-economy-toearn-cash-boost-savings/; Jonathan Rothwell, Earning Income on the Side is a Large and Growing Slice of
American Life, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/18/upshot/multiple-jobsunited-states.html.
This, of course, raises a further question of socioeconomic inequality: Why would an individual need a
second or third gig in the first place? If one’s primary employment fails to provide adequate income on
which to live, we might rightfully be concerned with the injustice that some people are not provided enough
working hours to make a decent income, or that their hourly wages or salaries are themselves too low.
While these concerns certainly merit further discussion, I would consider the sharing economy at best a
byproduct capitalizing on this situation or, at worst, perpetuating it, but in neither case its primary cause.
Therefore, those questions lay outside our current purview.
See Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employer Costs for Employee Compensation – September
2020 (Dec. 17, 2020), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/ecec.pdf; Cynthia Meyer, How Much Are Your
Benefits Really Worth?, FORBES (Sept. 24, 2018, 10:00 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/financialfinesse/2018/09/24/how-much-are-your-benefits-reallyworth/?sh=ec729a378797.
See Greg Iacurci, The Gig Economy Has Ballooned by 6 Million People Since 2010. Financial Worries May
Follow, CNBC (Feb. 4, 2020, 12:00 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/02/04/gig-economy-grows-15percentover-past-decade-adp-report.html; Elka Torpey & Andrew Hogan, Working in a Gig Economy, CAREER
OUTLOOK (May 2016), https://www.bls.gov/careeroutlook/2016/article/what-is-the-gig-economy.htm.
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Uber drivers stick with the platform for over a year, 86 and while that turnover rate
does create supply problems for rideshare companies, the number of ready drivers
remains massive. 87 Lyft estimates that two million Americans drove for the
company at some point during 2018, roughly one percent of the U.S. workforce. 88
Looking beyond just rideshare services, a 2016 Pew Research Center report
found that “nearly one-in-ten Americans (8%) have earned money in the last year
using digital platforms to take on a job or task. Meanwhile, nearly one-in-five
Americans (18%) have earned money in the last year by selling something online,
while 1% have rented out their properties on a home-sharing site.” 89 While the
sharing economy by no means encapsulates the majority of U.S. workers, a sizeable
and growing number of Americans are performing gig work.
This ready supply of gig workers, combined with the disconnected networks
in which they operate, limits their bargaining leverage and likely leads to wage
exploitation. Workers in the sharing economy often earn shockingly low wages;
some argue that the system is exploitative. 90 Consider Amazon Mechanical Turk
(MTurk), a service run by Amazon that the company describes as “a crowdsourcing
marketplace that makes it easier for individuals and businesses to outsource their
processes and jobs to a distributed workforce who can perform these tasks
virtually.” 91 In plain language, you can pay a worker a set fee to complete some
electronic task. Academic researchers are increasingly using this platform for data
collection, offering workers a small payment for completing surveys and
questionnaires—and I do mean small: MTurk workers earn a mean hourly wage of
just over three dollars, with the median wage just below two dollars. 92 Sadly, for
many researchers—myself included 93—these lower costs are not simply a byproduct
86
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88
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90
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92

93
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Id.
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https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2016/11/17/gig-work-online-selling-and-home-sharing.
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12:30 PM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/5/28/18638480/gig-economy-workers-wellbeingsurvey.
AMAZON MECHANICAL TURK, https://www.mturk.com/ (last visited Aug. 31, 2020).
Kotaro Hara, Abigail Adams, Kristy Milland, Saiph Savage, Chris Callison-Burch & Jeffrey P. Bigham, A
Data-Driven Analysis of Workers' Earnings on Amazon Mechanical Turk, 2018 CHI CONF. ON HUM. FACTORS
COMPUTING SYS. no. 449, at 1–2. See generally Alice M. Brawley & Cynthia L.S. Pury, Work Experiences on
MTurk: Job Satisfaction, Turnover, and Information Sharing, 54 COMPUTERS HUM. BEHAV. 531 (2016)
(analyzing MTurk user experience while exemplifying how MTurk is used for research). All figures are in
U.S. dollars.
Nicholas Browning, Sung-Un Yang, Young Eun Park, Ejae Lee & Taeyoung Kim, Do Ethics Matter?
Investigating Donor Responses to Primary and Tertiary Ethical Violations, 96 JOURNALISM & MASS COMM. Q.
1145, 1153–54 (2019) (using MTurk); Browning et al., supra note 45, at 1035, 1042 (same); Kaye D.
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of the service but a central feature driving the bump in usage. MTurk samples
provide access to data that is roughly similar in quality to that collected through
more rigorous panel services, and for pennies on the dollar. 94 Absent grant money,
university researchers—particularly in the humanities and social sciences—face
budget constraints that often place us in the uncomfortable position of relying on
MTurk in spite of the moral objections we may have to the payment structure.
MTurk, as it turns out, is more the rule than the exception when it comes to
wages. 95 People that round up and charge Lime electric scooters (called “juicers”) 96
have experienced a recent crash in wages. Lime initially offered juicers upwards of
ten dollars to pick up, charge, and drop off an electric scooter. 97 That rate had fallen
to about three dollars by early 2020. 98 Moreover, as Lime limits juicers to four
chargers, rolls out more durable and heavier scooters that are harder to load, and
cuts back on drop-off hubs, the margins for juicers have become even tighter. 99
Calculating wages for rideshare drivers is much more complex. According to
the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, drivers earn a median hourly wage of about
$16.01, but that number lumps taxi drivers, chauffeurs, and bus drivers in with
rideshare drivers. 100 Uber reports that drivers earn, on average, $19.35 an hour,
while other outside studies estimate the number to range from fourteen to sixteen
dollars. 101 Problematically, none of these wage reports factor in other expenses,
such as “costs for maintenance, repairs, and earlier replacement due to wear94
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See Jennifer Liu, The Top Companies That Pay Gig Worker the Most, from Airbnb to Costco, CNBC (Aug.
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definitions of what even constitutes gig work, differing pay structures across platforms, and varying rates
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See How to Make Money as a Lime Charger, GIGWORKER, https://gigworker.com/job/lime-juicer/ (last visited
Jan. 15, 2021) (“Lime Juicers are independent contractors who take on the responsibility of collecting lowbattery Lime scooters from scooter locations, charging the scooters overnight at their homes, and dropping
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(Oct. 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/25/business/lime-bird-scooters-rechargers.html.
Tessa McLean, Pay to Charge Lime Scooters Has Sunk So Low ‘Juicers’ Won't Do It Anymore, SFGATE (Feb.
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VICE (Feb. 19, 2020, 12:56 PM), https://www.vice.com/en_ca/article/pkez8v/lime-has-slashed-pay-rates-forscooter-chargers-so-much-people-have-stopped-doing-it.
Passenger Vehicle Drivers, U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT., https://www.bls.gov/ooh/transportation-and-materialmoving/passenger-vehicle-drivers.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2020).
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out.” 102 These expenses are notoriously difficult to account for because rideshare
drivers use their own vehicles; separating out personal and professional use on
issues of wear and tear is not simple. Still, researchers have tried. One highly
contested study argues that rideshare drivers may net as little as $3.37 an hour
after accounting for expenses and fees. 103 Others more generally estimate expenses
to shave roughly five dollars off a driver’s hourly rate. 104 By most estimates, that
would drop hourly earnings below ten dollars, down to roughly $7.50 relying on U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics calculations, just twenty-five cents higher than the
federal minimum wage. 105
Table 1
Monthly Earnings in the Sharing Economy 106
Company
Monthly
Monthly
Average
Median
Airbnb
$924
$440
TaskRabbit
$380
$110
Lyft
$377
$210
Uber
$364
$155
Doordash
$229
$100
Postmates
$174
$70
Etsy
$151
$40
Fiverr
$103
$60
Getaround
$98
$70
Total
$299
$109
Extrapolating outwards, workers in other sectors of the sharing economy do
not fare much better, especially when one considers these are often part-time jobs
for many workers. Table 1 takes this into account, displaying the average and
median monthly wages of workers on nine common sharing-economy platforms. On
average, these workers can expect to take home about $300 a month, with median
wages much lower, at about $100. These lower median values suggest that, while
some may earn living wages in the gig economy, they represent an astonishingly
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Molla, supra note 101.
See Minimum Wage, U.S. DEP’T LAB., https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/wages/minimumwage (last visited
Sept. 9, 2020).
See Catherine New, How Much Are People Making from the Sharing Economy?, EARNEST,
https://www.earnest.com/blog/sharing-economy-income-data/
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(last updated Mar. 31, 2020).

32

Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality

[9:18

small minority across most platforms—in most cases, fewer than ten percent of total
users. 107
III. THE SOCIETAL COSTS OF “SHARED” EXTERNALITIES
Part of the wage suppression comes from hidden costs assumed by workers in
the gig economy. Essentially, these amount to externalities, what Eckhardt and
colleagues refer to as “the dark side of the sharing economy.” 108 According to
sociologist Michel Callon, externalities occur when “certain agents pursue courses of
action the costs of which are borne by other agents, with no visible transfer taking
place . . . . Negative externalities imply social costs that are not taken into account
by private decision-makers; positive externalities discourage private investment by
socializing the benefits.” 109 Technically, externalities represent a type of market
failure. 110 Generally, we frame economic exchanges as taking place between actors
within a closed system in which all costs and benefits are accounted for. 111 When
these costs or benefits overflow outside the exchange frame, the resultant gap
represents an inefficiency in what was designed as a zero-sum game. 112
Depending on whether the externality is positive or negative, the
organization taking part in the exchange may experience a burden or a boon. As
such, a company—whether in a traditional or sharing economy—is highly
incentivized to eliminate positive externalities. After all, why would a for-profit
entity offer a product, service, or feature for free when it could charge for such
elements? This, in part, explains things such as increased costs for organic versus
nonorganic produce, high prescription drug prices to recoup R&D costs, or demands
for municipal tax breaks when relocating hubs and headquarters. 113 There is no
profit in socializing a benefit that could otherwise be monetized.
On the other hand, negative externalities shift costs away from the
organization to some other agent: consumer, worker, government, society writ large,
etc. While negative externalities may visit harm—economic or otherwise—onto
organizational stakeholders, they do create boosts in profit, and, as such,
107
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Id. at 247.
See id. at 248.
See id. at 247.
See Charles Fombrun & Mark Shanley, What’s in a Name? Reputation Building and Corporate Strategy, 33
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organizations may be slow to rectify them. In fact, some parties “have an interest in
maintaining the state of controversy and ignorance” that allows for such
externalities to perpetuate. 114
This is not to say that organizations in the sharing economy shift every
burden to outside actors. In several instances, they actively take them on. Airbnb
offers the dual services of host guarantee and host protection insurance. The former
service insures hosts against damage done to their home or possessions by guests
and their service animals; 115 the latter service provides up to one million dollars in
liability insurance for bodily injury to guests. 116 Uber offers similar insurances for
drivers, 117 but the breakdown is somewhat telling. While drivers are awaiting a ride
request—that is, they are alone in the car—bodily injury insurance caps out at
$100,000 per accident and $50,000 per person—and that liability insurance only
kicks in “if your personal auto insurance doesn’t apply.” 118 When drivers are en
route to a pickup or carrying passengers, that amount jumps to one million
dollars. 119 This distinction indicates that Uber values the health and well-being of
its consumers more so than its workers, as the company is more willing to
ameliorate negative externalities that apply to riders as opposed to drivers.
Indeed, what Uber does not cover is just as telling. Drivers are required to
hold comprehensive and collision coverage on their auto insurance, 120 outpacing the
legal liability standard applied by most state governments. 121 If a driver’s car is
damaged in an accident—regardless of fault—Uber does not provide any funding for
a rental car. 122 At the very least this creates a major inconvenience for drivers, and
for those who drive as a primary source of income, the loss could be devastating—
and this does not even touch on the personal burdens faced by a lack of
transportation (e.g., taking children to school, purchasing groceries and other
essentials, etc.). Finally, maintenance, gas, and repairs are driver responsibilities.
The company’s policy clearly uses the contractor standing of workers as a primary
reason in its FAQs: “Does the insurance that Uber maintains on behalf of drivers
cover regular maintenance on my car? No, as an independent contractor you’re
responsible for your car maintenance.” 123 The classification of Uber drivers—and of
most workers in the sharing economy—as independent contractors also exempt
companies from providing insurance to gig workers under the Affordable Care Act’s
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Callon, supra note 109, at 263.
Airbnb’s Host Guarantee, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/d/guarantee (last visited Sept. 6, 2020).
Host Protection Insurance, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/d/host-protection-insurance (last visited Sept. 9,
2020).
Auto Insurance, UBER, https://www.uber.com/us/en/drive/insurance/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2020).
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Id.
Id.
See Liability Laws, AAA DIG. MOTOR LAWS, https://drivinglaws.aaa.com/tag/liability-laws/ (last visited Nov.
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Id.
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(Obamacare) requirements. 124 Under the law, businesses that employ fifty or more
people full time are required to provide insurance or pay an additional tax; 125
estimates for the number of Uber drivers range from one to three million,
presumably more than fifty of whom clock more than thirty hours a week. 126
While the negative externalities of rideshare companies seem purposely
created and maintained, others seem to come about more by happenstance. As
Eckhardt and colleagues succinctly state, “a sharing economy brand’s actual value
may differ from its intended value.” 127 This is not unique to the sharing economy,
and one way to boost sales of a product is to develop new uses. 128 As a seemingly
odd example, consider baking soda. Developed in 1846, baking soda was designed as
an additive to prompt baked goods to rise during cooking. 129 The problem for a
company like Arm & Hammer is that you do not need a lot of it. For instance, a
recipe for 48 cookies calls for about 1 teaspoon of baking soda; 130 with 48 teaspoons
in a typical 8-ounce box, that comes out to 2,304 cookies. Needless to say, baking
alone will not move much product in typical households, but when you use boxes as
fridge fresheners or include baking soda in various cleaning and hygiene products,
now you have added value beyond its original intended use.
Now consider electric scooters as a similar case in the sharing economy. Lime
and Bird are two of the major players in this industry, and each clearly states a
commitment to re-envisioning transportation with an eye toward environmental
sustainability. 131 Lime’s mission statement reads, in part, “[t]hrough the equitable
distribution of shared scooters, bikes and transit vehicles, we aim to reduce
dependence on personal automobiles for short distance transportation and leave
future generations with a cleaner, healthier planet.” 132 Bird is even less equivocal:
“Bird’s mission is to make cities more livable by reducing car usage, traffic, and
carbon emissions.” 133 These aims are admirable, especially considering that
environmental externalities are often overlooked, so much so that scholars have
124
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https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/great-uprising-how-powder-revolutionized-baking180963772/.
See Ultimate Chocolate Chip Cookies, BETTY CROCKER, https://www.bettycrocker.com/recipes/ultimatechocolate-chip-cookies/77c14e03-d8b0-4844-846d-f19304f61c57 (last updated Jan. 13, 2021).
About Us, LIME, https://www.li.me/about-us (last visited Sept. 10, 2020); Life at Bird, BIRD,
https://www.bird.co/about/ (last visited Sept. 10, 2020).
About Us, supra note 131.
Life at Bird, supra note 131.
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proposed developing return on sharing metrics that capture environmental impacts,
as well as other key externalities. 134
Assuming these companies are authentic in their pursuit of environmental
benefits, the manner in which consumers use electric scooters may undercut that
mission. Broadly speaking, there are two major ways electric scooters could reduce
carbon emissions: replacing car trips or supplementing city transit systems. 135 The
latter aspect involves addressing the first-mile, last-mile problem: people are most
likely to use public transportation when bus, train, or underground stops are no
farther than one mile from their beginning and ending destinations, as people are
often unwilling to walk longer than one mile from a transit stop to terminal
destinations. 136 Theoretically, electric scooters could supplement public
transportation by allowing users to quickly cover longer distances from transit stops
to final points of arrival.

134
135

136

See Eckhardt et al., supra note 10, at 19.
See Jeremiah Johnson, Are Shared E-Scooters Good for the Planet?, CONVERSATION (Aug. 2, 2019, 8:01 AM),
https://theconversation.com/are-shared-e-scooters-good-for-the-planet-only-if-they-replace-car-trips-121166
(explaining that scooters need to replace car travel, not public transit, in order to reduce carbon emissions).
See David A. King, What Do We Know About the “First Mile/Last Mile” Problem for Transit?, TRANSPORTIST
BY DAVID LEVINSON (Oct. 6, 2016), https://transportist.org/2016/10/06/what-do-we-know-about-the-firstmilelast-mile-problem-for-transit/.
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Figure 1 – A 1-Mile Radius from Bloomington’s Downtown Transit Hub
There is ample evidence that this is not the case. Consider Bloomington,
Indiana, anecdotally. Figure 1 depicts an image of the city. The circle has a one-mile
radius, with the Bloomington bus depot at its center, where all of the city’s bus
routes intersect. 137 You can easily see that what is colloquially considered the
downtown area lies within one mile of the main transit hub. As such, you would
expect to see relatively few electric scooters in the area if they were being used to
supplement the bus system. What you find is just the opposite: Bloomington’s
downtown has a high concentration of electric scooters.
137

See GOOGLE MAPS, https://www.google.com/maps/ (enter “Bloomington IN” as search term; then enter
“Bloomington Transit” as search term) (last visited Nov. 11, 2020).
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While these observations are anecdotal, data from other municipalities, such
as Portland, San Francisco, Santa Monica, and Denver, support the general
assertion. 138 Researchers in these cities have found that less than half of electric
scooter trips are replacing car trips. 139 Instead, roughly ten percent are replacing a
public transit trip, ten percent are replacing a biking trip, and thirty-six percent are
replacing a walking trip. 140 As biking and walking are carbon neutral, the use of
electric scooters in their stead actually increases environmental damages as opposed
to reducing them, with studies estimating that a one kilometer electric scooter ride
generates sixty-two grams of carbon dioxide emissions. 141 Also consider that this
measure does not capture the environmental impacts of mining or developing
materials to build the scooters, with the aluminum-ion and lithium-ion batteries
being particularly costly. 142 Moreover, early models of many electric scooters only
lasted about two months given the abuse visited upon them by users, 143 meaning
many of those materials quickly made their way into landfills. 144
In the end, the use of electric scooters may be causing greater environmental
harm than good. This is arguably the fault of the consumer who uses the
product/service in ways not originally intended, but because these companies still
profit from the usage and because the cost of the negative externality is borne by
others, there is little incentive to address the problem. Similar issues occur with
unintended usage patterns in other sectors of the sharing economy, perhaps most
notably in rental services like Airbnb.
Airbnb began in 2007, when two cash-strapped roommates rented space in
their San Francisco apartment to make extra money. 145 This experience is a
microcosm of the gig economy as theoretically envisioned: a side hustle undertaken
by workers to earn supplemental income. 146 Scaled, Airbnb was designed to
replicate this experience, allowing hosts to rent extra rooms or potentially their
entire residences when they themselves traveled for work or pleasure. Like a sort of
working-class venture capitalism, the service would allow even those without access
to large amounts of capital to put their limited assets to work making money.
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Anthony Eggert, E Is for Environment: Unpacking the Benefits of E-Scooters, FORBES (Mar. 5, 2020, 12:39
PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/anthonyeggert/2020/03/05/e-is-for-environment-unpacking-the-benefitsof-e-scooters/#5843cf2261c3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.; Sigal Samuel, We Regret to Inform You that Scooters Aren’t Actually Good for the Environment, Vox
(Aug. 8, 2019, 12:35 PM), https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2019/8/8/20759062/electric-scooterenvironment-climate-change-bird-lime.
Eggert, supra note 138.
TAUR, Electric Scooter Battery Maintenance and Disposal Tips, MEDIUM: TAUR (Apr. 18, 2020),
https://medium.com/@ride.taur/electric-scooter-battery-maintenance-and-disposal-tips-17f4d75efa1b.
Rebecca Aydin, How 3 Guys Turned Renting Air Mattresses in Their Apartment into a $31 Billion Company,
Airbnb, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 20, 2019, 10:27 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/how-airbnb-was-foundeda-visual-history-2016-2.
See id.
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As the company has grown, the wealthy and investor classes have become
responsible for an increasingly larger percentage of Airbnb listings and profits. 147
While data is difficult to come by, the two pivotal groups to consider here are
multiple-unit operators (hosts who list more than one property) and full-time
operators (hosts that list a single property for 360 or more days a year). 148 For these
hosts, Airbnb appears less a gig and more of a primary income source. 149 A 2014 to
2015 analysis of Airbnb revenue in twelve major U.S. markets found that multipleunit operators accounted for 39% of revenue, and full-time operators accounted for
29%. 150 Similarly, looking at growth in Airbnb hosts from 2016 to 2019, the most
significant expansion has come from those listing two or more properties
simultaneously. 151
This changing host profile has effectively transformed a sizeable chunk of
workers from one-off renters to independent hotel operators. COVID-19 has laid
bare this reality. Several upper middle-class and upper-class hosts have broken into
this hybrid real estate, hotel-mogul market hoping to build wealth. 152 Many overleveraged and over-extended their finances to do so. 153 The crash in tourism and
travel that accompanied the coronavirus left many with no recourse as several
depended on the income from Airbnb guests to pay mortgages. 154 Hemorrhaging
money, receiving little to no support from Airbnb, and facing limited prospects of
substantial government bail-out money based on their contractor-like status, many
of these multiple-listing hosts are facing foreclosures and possible bankruptcy. 155
Nevertheless, the over-extended hosts may engender little sympathy from
onlookers. After all, they undertook the risk freely, and most had other
opportunities for earning income. Bluntly speaking, they gambled and lost, a
common outcome in capitalist economies. Still, the expansion of full-time and
multiple-listing operators bring with them a string of other societal externalities
that place local municipalities in a series of seemingly intractable dilemmas.
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AM. HOTEL & LODGING ASS’N, FROM AIR MATTRESSES TO UNREGULATED BUSINESS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE OTHER
SIDE OF AIRBNB (2016), https://ahla.com/sites/default/files/2016-10/Airbnb_Analysis_September_2016.pdf.
Id. Note that there is sometimes overlap between these two groups.
See id.
Id.; Jelisa Castrodale, Study Says that a Large Percentage of Airbnb Revenue Comes from Hosts with
Multiple Listings, USA TODAY (Jan. 22, 2016, 9:00 AM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/travel/roadwarriorvoices/2016/01/22/study-says-that-a-large-percentage-ofairbnb-revenue-comes-from-hosts-with-multiple-listings/83314154/.
Rosie Spinks, What Even Is Airbnb Anymore?, QUARTZ (Mar. 23, 2019),
https://qz.com/quartzy/1574182/ahead-of-its-ipo-what-even-is-airbnb-anymore/.
JOSH BIVENS, ECON. POL’Y INST., THE ECONOMIC COSTS AND BENEFITS OF AIRBNB, 6–8 (2019),
https://files.epi.org/pdf/157766.pdf.
See Tripp Mickle & Preetika Rana, ‘A Bargain with the Devil’—Bill Comes Due for Overextended Airbnb
Hosts, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 28, 2020, 10:15 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-bargain-with-the-devilbillcomes-due-for-overextended-airbnb-hosts-11588083336.
Id.
See id.
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IV. PUBLIC COSTS AND BENEFITS
A. Economic Gains and Losses
Governments, from local municipalities all the way up to the federal level,
have complex relationships with sharing platforms. On the one hand, sharing
platforms pump money into city coffers, both directly and indirectly. 156 Mike
McAfee, the executive director of Visit Bloomington (essentially the city’s tourism
bureau), spoke to the value of these companies to the Bloomington community, in
particular Airbnb. 157 Citing statistics from Airbnb, McAfee stated that there were
660 active listings in Bloomington. 158 During 2019, roughly 34,000 guests stayed in
these short-term rentals, netting hosts about four million dollars for the year, for an
average of $6,060 per listing. 159
Airbnb produces some gains for the community. First, competition brings
down hotel rates, not just through lower pricing but also by adding to the supply of
short-term rentals, encouraging travel to Bloomington. 160 Second, as of July 1, 2019,
Airbnb and other short-term rental platforms were required to pay as much in local
taxes as a hotel would, boosting that pool of tax revenue six percent. 161 Third, fortyone percent of Airbnb guests’ spending occurs in neighborhoods and towns where
guests stay, much of which goes to local businesses; indeed, hosts commonly
recommend restaurants, bars, and tourist destinations to guests. 162 Tourist dollars
not only help the local economy, but they also boost city revenue through sales and
other local taxes. 163
However, such economic gains are potentially offset by material losses to the
community. As McAfee remarked, “I know several people in Bloomington that are
buying second homes to put on the Airbnb market, and they call that their
retirement.” 164 While that is certainly a potential gain for those residents, he and
other panelists from the IJLSE symposium also rightly acknowledged the negative
impacts Airbnb expansion has on the local housing market. Community organizer
Daniel Bingham pointed out that Airbnb reported 280 active listings in
156

157
158
159

160
161
162
163
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See, e.g., Tod Newcombe, The Sharing Economy: Developing an Outcome-Based Strategy, GOV’T TECH., (Dec.
11, 2015), https://www.govtech.com/dc/articles/The-Sharing-Economy-Developing-an-Outcome-BasedStrategy.html (states consider taxing services). See generally Sebastion Vith, Achim Oberg, Markus A
Höllerer & Renate E. Meyer, Envisioning the ‘Sharing City’: Governance Strategies for the Sharing
Economy, 159 J. BUS. ETHICS 1023 (2019).
IU Maurer, supra note 1, at 8:22.
Id. at 8:52
Id. at 9:37, 10:07; see also Barbara Brosher, Airbnb: Bloomington Hosts Earned $359,000 During Football
Weekends, IND. PUB. MEDIA, (Nov. 22, 2017), https://indianapublicmedia.org/news/airbnb-bloomington-hostsearn-359000-football-weekends-1328621.php.
See BIVENS, supra note 152, at 9–10.
IU Maurer, supra note 1.
Id. at 10:47, 11:20.
Id.
Id. at 10:14.
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Bloomington during 2017. 165 During that same year, Bloomington added roughly
500 housing units during a period of larger-than-usual expansion. 166 The Airbnb
growth from 2017 to 2019 amounts to 380 new listings. 167 While it is unlikely that
all those new listings are full-time, some almost certainly are—particularly the
“retirement” homes McAfee spoke of. 168 Such listings limit an already small supply
of affordable housing, driving housing costs even higher. In 2017, the median sales
price for a home in Indiana was $146,900 (up 5.7% from the previous year). 169 In
Monroe County, home to Bloomington, that figure was $179,950 (up 6.5%), making
Monroe the seventh most expensive housing market out of the state’s ninety-two
counties. 170
By no means is this scenario unique to Bloomington. A 2019 Economic Policy
Institute report found that, for most municipalities, the “economic costs Airbnb
imposes likely outweigh the benefits.” 171 According to the report, there are
numerous reasons for the loss. First, the net tourism benefits Airbnb touts are
likely overstated. 172 While Airbnb might offer guests cheaper accommodations, the
costs of lodging are not major barriers for most travelers. 173 If Airbnb were
unavailable, most would still travel and simply opt for slightly more expensive
hotels, still pumping tourism dollars into local economies. 174
This replacement of traditional hotel stays by Airbnb feeds into a second
cause for limited economic gains: many cities do not tax Airbnb short-term rentals
in the same manner or at the same rate as hotel lodging. 175 Therefore, when Airbnb
pulls guests away from hotel chains, cities often lose tax revenue. 176
Third, in cities with high concentrations of Airbnb listings, the resultant
reduction in housing supply drives housing costs up for residents. 177
Fourth, Airbnb rentals operate outside the confines of many zoning laws that
restrict competing hotels. 178 As a result, residential neighborhoods face increased
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Id. at 44:48.
Id. at 45:14
Id. at 8:55, 45:04. As of January 1, 2019, there were 660 Airbnb listings in Bloomington, an increase of 380
from the 2017 number of 280.
Id. at 10:14.
MATT KINGHORN & SHINWOO LEE, KELLEY SCH. OF BUS., IND. BUS. RESEARCH CTR., THE STATE OF INDIANA’S
HOUSING MARKET app. at 24 tbl.3 (2018), https://www.ibrc.indiana.edu/studies/IAR_2018_Final.pdf.
Id. at 25 tbl.3.
BIVENS, supra note 152, at 2.
Id. at 12.
See id. at 9–10.
See id.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 18.
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externalities ranging from the inconvenience of increased noise to increased stress
on infrastructure like roads, trash, and waste management. 179
Fifth, and finally, the monetary gains from Airbnb are skewed to benefit
property owners, in particular those who own and operate multiple or full-time
listings on the platform. 180 Not surprisingly, this profile is comprised of individuals
who are predominately wealthy and White. 181 This pattern exacerbates both income
and racial inequalities (1) on the front end by funneling money to wealthy, White
operators and (2) on the back end by limiting the supply of affordable housing units,
which disproportionately harms poorer and minority populations.
B. Safety Concerns
The growth of Airbnb also creates concerns about public safety that present
regulatory challenges stretching far beyond a single platform. Because Airbnb hosts
operate like independent contractors, regulations regarding safety, access for those
with disabilities, and other rules that apply to hotels often do not apply to Airbnb
rentals. 182 Public safety issues reverberate throughout the sharing economy, with
electric scooters as perhaps the most prominent example—at least in
Bloomington. 183
A major problem here is how to classify the electric scooter as it is a relatively
new mode of transportation. 184 Existing laws governing similar modes of transport,
such as bicycles or motorcycles, often serve as umbrellas under which electric
scooter regulations are placed or, at the very least, jumping off points for specific
electric scooter regulatory standards. Consider the issue of helmets. Despite the fact
that D.C. and forty-nine states have mandated seat belt use since 1996, 185 only D.C.
and nineteen states have universal helmet laws for motorcycle riders. 186 Three
states—Illinois, Iowa, and New Hampshire—have no helmet laws, while the
remaining twenty-eight states require only specific riders (typically minors) to wear
179

180
181
182
183
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Consequently, McAfee noted that a major concern of Bloomington residents is that Airbnb rentals
sometimes turn into “party houses” that, in turn, add these same stressors. See IU Maurer, supra note 1, at
17:30.
BIVENS, supra note 152.
Id. at 7–8.
See Casey Rockwell, Chase Edwards & Stephen Burns, Legal Ambiguity as a Competitive Advantage:
Airbnb’s Use of Technological Novelty to Avoid Liability, 46 REAL EST. L.J. 356, 358–59 (2017).
See Kurt Christian, Proposal to Ban Scooters on City Sidewalks Struck Down, HERALD-TIMES (May 1, 2019),
https://www.hoosiertimes.com/herald_times_online/news/local/proposal-to-ban-scooters-on-city-sidewalksstruck-down/article_eebc7ceb-038e-5137-a17d-cc42e7279c1c.html.
Kurt Christian, ‘Scooter Anarchy!’ Bloomington Comments on City’s Scooter Survey, HERALD-TIMES (Apr. 10,
2019), https://www.hoosiertimes.com/herald_times_online/news/local/scooter-anarchy-bloomingtoncomments-on-citys-scooter-survey/article_b3162e8a-ebb5-5176-b757-f21a76506a70.html.
New Hampshire, whose residents apparently take the state’s “Live Free or Die” motto quite seriously, is the
lone holdout. Primary Enforcement of Seat Belt Laws, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/motorvehiclesafety/calculator/factsheet/seatbelt.html (last updated Dec. 2, 2015).
Motorcyclists, GOVERNORS HIGHWAY SAFETY ASS’N, https://www.ghsa.org/state-laws/issues/motorcyclists (last
visited Sept. 13, 2020).

42

Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality

[9:18

helmets. 187 Moreover, no state has a universal helmet law for bicyclists. 188 D.C. and
twenty-one states require riders under a certain age (usually about sixteen years
old) to wear helmets, while the other twenty-nine states have no bicycle helmet
laws. 189 Indiana repealed its universal motorcycle helmet law in 1977 and now only
requires that minors wear helmets; 190 the state has no bicycle helmet law. 191 As
such, though electric scooter companies like Bird and Lime encourage helmet use,
lax laws applying to vehicles similar to electric scooters make it virtually impossible
for cities like Bloomington to mandate helmet use despite the mounting cases of
head injuries that result from electric scooters. 192
Though such injuries create negative externalities for communities, one
might argue that riders assume the brunt of the damage that results from the
refusal to wear helmets, so they should be free to assume that risk. Even if we
accept that logic, for the sake of argument, electric scooters also represent public
safety threats to nonriders, most commonly pedestrians. Again, given the relative
novelty of electric scooters, laws regarding other similar vehicles typically govern
their use as well. 193 In terms of where electric scooters may be ridden, bicycle laws
typically apply, or at least set an initial standard considering similarities in vehicle
sizes and speeds. 194 Bloomington’s case may serve as a microcosm representing the
broader regulatory issues faced by local governments.
Bloomington considers itself a bike-friendly town, but like most other U.S.
cities, its infrastructure is designed with a car-first mentality. 195 Though
Bloomington has added dedicated bike lanes on several streets, many roads are too
narrow for such lanes. Additionally, several major thoroughfares connecting the city
center to the suburban and rural areas allow for high-speed traffic (greater than
fifty miles per hour). The result is that cyclists often feel unsafe riding bikes on
many city and county roads. 196 To encourage greater bicycle transit use, the City

187
188
189
190
191
192

193
194
195

196

Id. (select “Illinois” and “Iowa” from dropdown menu to view more information).
Bicyclists and Pedestrians, GOVERNORS HIGHWAY SAFETY ASS’N, https://www.ghsa.org/taxonomy/term/501
(last visited Sept. 13, 2020).
Id.
Motorcyclists, supra note 186 (select “Indiana” from dropdown menu).
See Bicyclists and Pedestrians, supra note 188.
See generally Bloomington City Council 4/10/2019, COMMUNITY ACCESS TELEVISION SERVS. (Apr. 10, 2019),
https://catstv.net/m.php?q=6701; Bloomington City Council Meeting 4/17/19, COMMUNITY ACCESS
TELEVISION SERVS. 1:38:00–4:55:00 (Apr. 17, 2019), https://catstv.net/m.php?q=6743.
See Scooter and Motorcycle Laws by State, GENUINE SCOOTER COMPANY,
http://www.genuinescooters.com/scooter-state-laws.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2020).
See id.
See John Frazer, The Reshaping of City Cores that Were Designed for Cars, FORBES (Aug. 6, 2019, 12:01
AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnfrazer1/2019/08/06/the-reshaping-of-city-cores-that-were-designedfor-cars/#649494401e46; Doug Gordon, American Cities Are Built for Cars. The Coronavirus Could Change
That., NEW REPUBLIC (May 26, 2020), https://newrepublic.com/article/157805/american-cities-built-carscoronavirus-change-that.
Ernest Rollins, City Council Legalizes Bicycling on Sidewalks, HERALD-TIMES (Aug. 10, 2017),
https://www.hoosiertimes.com/herald_times_online/news/local/city-council-legalizes-bicycling-onsidewalks/article_e12c2b0d-3c60-5b74-931f-917c17e240ed.html.
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Council passed an ordinance allowing cyclists to ride on some sidewalks. 197 When
electric scooters arrived in Bloomington, sidewalk use of scooters was permitted,
largely as a result of the bicycle ordinance. 198 The sheer volume of scooters,
combined with their speed (up to fifteen miles per hour), led to pedestrian
injuries. 199 In an informal survey of Bloomington residents, just under ten percent
of those who reported an injury from an electric scooter classified themselves as
non-users of electric scooters, meaning that at least that percentage of injuries were
suffered by nonriders—though the actual number may be higher. 200
Additionally, electric scooters have proven particularly hazardous for those
with disabilities. First, the vision and hearing impaired are uniquely vulnerable to
collisions with electric scooters on sidewalks given their inability to either see or
hear vehicles approaching. 201 Additionally, the lack of dedicated parking spaces for
the grab-and-go scooters leads many riders to “park” scooters in the middle of
sidewalks, which creates tripping hazards for all pedestrians. 202 However, scooterlittered walkways are particularly problematic for the blind and those in
wheelchairs. 203 The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) requires five feet of
walking space on sidewalks to accommodate wheelchair users, and even if properly
parked on the sidewalk, electric scooters eat into this required space. 204
C. The High Price of Access
The story of electric scooters and the ADA represents just one of several
inequities in how burdens are borne in the sharing economy. While I have touched
on many of these externalities, the nature and cost of access to platforms merits
more detailed discussion here. As Bingham points out, companies in the sharing
economy typically do not share anything; rather, their main role is to provide
consumers and workers access to a marketplace, and the price of that access is
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Tyler Lake, Bicycles, Skateboards Now Allowed on Some Bloomington Streets, IND. PUB. MEDIA (Aug. 10,
2017), https://indianapublicmedia.org/news/bicycles-skateboards-allowed-city-streets-125237.php.
See Scooter Guidelines, CITY BLOOMINGTON, IND., https://bloomington.in.gov/transportation/scooters (last
visited Sept. 13, 2020).
See Cathy Bussewitz & Amanda Morris, Boom in Electric Scooters Leads to More Injuries, Fatalities,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (June 6, 2019), https://apnews.com/33f376b91e5945efbcbb2c460b1d0dcc.
See CITY OF BLOOMINGTON, SCOOTER SURVEY REPORT 5, 11 (2019),
https://bloomington.in.gov/sites/default/files/2019-04/Scooter%20Survey%20Report.pdf. See generally Peter
Holley, Pedestrians and E-Scooters Are Clashing in the Struggle for Sidewalk Space, WASH. POST (Jan. 11,
2019, 12:08 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/pedestrians-and-e-scooters-areclashing-in-the-struggle-for-sidewalk-space/2019/01/11/4ccc60b0-0ebe-11e9-831f-3aa2c2be4cbd_story.html.
James Tapper, Invasion of the Electric Scooter: Can Our Cities Cope?, GUARDIAN (July 15, 2019, 1:00 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2019/jul/15/invasion-electric-scooter-backlash.
Holley, supra note 200.
Tapper, supra note 201.
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2018); see PUBLIC RIGHTS-OF-WAY ACCESS
ADVISORY COMMITTEE, FINAL REPORT: BUILDING A TRUE COMMUNITY 35 (2001), https://www.accessboard.gov/files/advisory-committee-reports/prow-report.pdf; Bloomington City Council Meeting 4/17/19,
supra note 192, at 3:18:00.
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rather steep. 205 For example, for every ride Uber charges a twenty-five percent
commission while Lyft charges twenty percent, which they both call a service fee. 206
While that advertised rate is already high, it does not account for booking and safe
ride fees, which, percentagewise, are especially extreme on shorter, lower-priced
trips. The end result is that rideshare companies take cuts of about forty percent on
some trips. 207
Rates for other platforms in the sharing economy often are not as steep as
those for rideshares, but they are still high. TaskRabbit charges users fifteen
percent of the total price paid for a specific task, on top of what is paid to the
Tasker. 208 Amazon’s MTurk uses a similar fee structure, though the rate is twenty
percent. 209 Airbnb charges relatively high fees as well, though they vary depending
on the fee structure chosen by the host: under a split-fee structure, the host
typically pays three percent while guests pay about fourteen percent; under a hostonly fee structure, the host pays fourteen to sixteen percent. 210
V. REGULATING OUR WAY OUT?
Clearly, the sharing economy is not all bad, but neither is it all good. Broadly
speaking, the local government’s regulatory role requires juggling responsibilities to
disparate—sometimes competing—interests and constituencies to reach some
desirable equilibrium:
How should policy entities balance the costs and benefits of
implementing sharing economy regulation? . . . On the one hand,
regulators should consider issues such as protecting consumers and
creating a level playing field for both new and incumbent competitors.
. . . On the other hand, regulators must balance these concerns against
the benefits that sharing platforms deliver. 211
In an ideal world, representatives and policymakers would simply create rules that
close systems, meaning companies in the sharing platform would be fully
responsible for curbing the impacts of negative externalities while still capturing
the value their platforms provide to consumers and workers. Unfortunately, this
ideal world is pure fantasy: “No contract is capable of, or has an interest in,
205
206

207
208
209
210

211

IU Maurer, supra note 1, at 43:48.
Brett Helling, Uber Fees: How Much Does Uber Pay, Actually? (With Case Studies), RIDESTER.COM,
https://www.ridester.com/uber-fees/ (last updated Jan. 7, 2021) [hereinafter Helling, Uber Fees] (“Both Lyft
and Uber claim that they never take more than 25 percent commission from their drivers.”); Brett Helling,
Understanding Lyft Fees for Passengers and Drivers, RIDESTER.COM, https://www.ridester.com/lyft-fees/ (last
updated Dec. 3, 2020) (taking fifty percent in the worst case).
Helling, Uber Fees, supra note 206.
What’s the TaskRabbit Service Fee?, TASKRABBIT, https://support.taskrabbit.com/hc/enus/articles/204411610-What-s-the-TaskRabbit-Service-Fee (last visited Aug. 31, 2020).
Pricing, AMAZON MECHANICAL TURK, https://www.mturk.com/pricing (last visited Aug. 31, 2020).
What Are Airbnb Service Fees?, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/1857/what-is-the-airbnbservice-fee (last visited Jan. 17, 2021).
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systematically suppressing all connections, burning all bridges or eliminating the
dual nature of every element involved. . . . It is therefore illusory to suppose that
one can internalize every externality by drawing up an all-embracing contract that
provides for every eventuality . . . .” 212
The systems, entities, and individuals interacting within the sharing
economy are simply too intertwined to cleanly separate, especially when you
consider the multiple roles they may serve. After all, an Uber driver is not always
an Uber driver: sometimes he or she is a rider or an employee of another enterprise,
but he or she is always a citizen. Consider also that relationships within the sharing
economy are ever changing, and the pace of innovation and introduction of new
platforms is too great to allow for silver bullet, catchall regulatory reform.
But that does not mean individuals should simply resign themselves to every
societal burden placed upon them by major players in the sharing economy, nor
should they stand idly by when organizations perpetuate and/or exacerbate
inequities we collectively deem unacceptable. There are certain actions local
governments can take both before and after new entrants and evolutions in the
sharing economy emerge, which may lead to principled regulation and reform that,
though perhaps not sweeping, might at least be sufficient to limit negative societal
impacts. It is here where Beth Rosenbarger, planning services manager for the
Bloomington Department of Planning and Transportation, offers valuable
guidance. 213
At the start, it is worth noting that the novelty of sharing economy platforms
and the changes they introduce sometimes prompt contrasting emotional reactions.
The first is a distracted awe, resulting in an eagerness to blindly embrace such
offerings as harbingers of promise and progress. 214 The second is a visceral fear of
change, resulting in a pugnacious attempt to preserve a community, economy, and
lifestyle with which one is comfortable. 215 Neither reaction is particularly rational,
inherently correct, or remotely useful. Instead, a more prudent approach would be
to greet new entrants with an open mind and a tempered optimism regarding the
benefits they may provide, but also with healthy skepticism that promises are
sometimes broken, plans often do not work out, and negative externalities—
whether intended or not—almost always accompany any gains.
From that frame of mind, representatives and policymakers can astutely
examine the impacts of sharing economy platforms and develop optimum rules and
regulations. When considering regulatory action, Rosenbarger argues it is best to
start with a discussion of broader principles, asking, “What are our goals as a
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community? And how does this new platform or option support or oppose our
community goals?” 216 This 30,000-foot view can be telling.
One of Bloomington’s community goals is to reduce damaging impacts on the
environment, 217 a goal I am sure many other cities share. Using this framework as
a starting point, we can rather easily evaluate whether certain platforms support,
oppose, or remain neutral to the goals our community sets for itself. Carsharing
services, like Zipcar, likely support this environmental goal as they reduce the need
for car ownership, limit car trips, and encourage use of greener transportation
alternatives—on top of improving air quality, which has several health benefits as
well. 218
Ridesharing companies like Uber and Lyft employ business models in direct
opposition to the city’s environmental goals. 219 First, traditional taxi services drop
off one passenger and typically pick up another passenger in that same location. 220
Uber and Lyft drivers rely on apps to prebook their next riders, whom they rarely
pick up at the same location as their previous passenger. 221 As a result, rideshare
services increase the number of miles traveled via car, consequently leading to
increased carbon emissions. 222 Second, rideshare services are often used as
alternatives to public transit, which again increases total carbon emissions. 223
Finally, Uber and Lyft offer transit options to users outside the limits of traditional
transit services. 224 While on the one hand this provides a desirable option for many
users, it may also encourage urban sprawl by offering an alternative transit service
that was quite purposely excluded by city planners. 225
216
217
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Once communities understand how players in the sharing economy impact
the community’s set goals, they can take action in the service of those goals. Now,
given the laissez-faire attitude many Americans hold toward innovation and
business ventures—at the individual, elected official, and judicial levels—outright
banning companies in the sharing economy from operating within specific cities or
townships remains difficult. 226 However, there are regulatory tools we can employ
to meaningfully alter behaviors and advance community goals.
Sticking with the environmental community goal, consider electric scooters.
Earlier, I outlined several negative environmental externalities of Bird and Lime
scooters, many stemming from the manner of use. 227 Specifically, when electric
scooters replace walking or biking trips, they create damaging externalities. 228
Changing the fee structure could alleviate this problem, at least to some extent.
Both Bird and Lime charge users one dollar to unlock an electric scooter for usage,
and then a per-minute rate while riding, which varies from city to city but typically
hovers in the neighborhood of twenty to forty cents. 229 Given the relatively low
unlocking charge, riders do not find it cost prohibitive to use electric scooters for
short trips. If, however, the unlocking fee were raised and included a preset number
of usage minutes, riders would be disincentivized from replacing walking trips with
electric scooter rides and instead encouraged to use electric scooters for longer
distances in place of car trips. 230 In much the same way companies lobby
governments for policy changes, the two-way nature of this relationship enables
governments to press platforms to make adjustments.
Another regulatory tool is the power of planning and infrastructure. Often
businesses succeed not simply because they offer a useful or innovative product or
service but because that product or service fits within existing infrastructures. 231 As
Bingham points out, a majority of sharing economy platforms build software code
using Linux, a collaboratively built, free, and open-source operating system. 232
Additionally, app developers often rely on other companies’ application
programming interfaces (APIs) and software development kits (SDKs) to make their
226

227
228
229

230
231

232

See generally Dennis R. Shaughnessy, “The Business of America Is Business!,” SEI FEB. 2017 NEWSL. (Ne.
Univ. Soc. Enter. Inst., Boston, Mass.), Feb. 2017, https://www.northeastern.edu/sei/2017/02/the-businessof-america-is-business/ (noting that some individuals believe "economic growth cures the ills of society");
David W. Moore, Majority of Americans Want to Start Own Business, GALLUP (Apr. 12, 2005),
https://news.gallup.com/poll/15832/majority-americans-want-start-own-business.aspx (discussing survey
responses that indicate most Americans, if given the choice, would prefer to start their own business).
See supra text accompanying notes 131–144.
Eggert, supra note 138.
See Luz Lazo, That Scooter Ride Is Going to Cost You a Lot More, WASH. POST (Oct. 18, 2019, 7:00 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/transportation/2019/10/18/that-scooter-ride-is-going-cost-you-lot-more/; see
also Ethan May, Here’s Everything You Need to Know About Bird and Lime Electric Scooters, INDYSTAR
(June 21, 2018, 1:07 PM), https://www.indystar.com/story/news/2018/06/21/bird-electric-scooters-rentalcosts-hours-charging-locations/720893002/.
See IU Maurer, supra note 1, at 26:12.
Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, Creating Shared Value: How to Reinvent Capitalism—and Unleash a
Wave of Innovation and Growth, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.–Feb. 2011, at 62, 72; IU Maurer, supra note 1, at
32:25.
IU Maurer, supra note 1, at 32:25.

48

Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality

[9:18

own apps functional and scalable. 233 For example, Uber and Lyft use Google’s
mapping API and SDK to track the location of their drivers and riders. 234 Had
Google not licensed that information, both Uber and Lyft would have to build their
own mapping services from the ground up. Developers’ willingness to share such
data makes the proliferation of apps and tech start-ups possible, with new entrants
benefiting from the work of other companies. 235
Similarly, infrastructure built and maintained by local municipalities can
either encourage or hinder the growth of platforms in the sharing economy. 236 For
instance, zoning laws that often apply to hotels and other short-term rental
operations typically do not apply to the residential properties rented out by Airbnb
hosts. 237 Zoning law loopholes allow Airbnb to establish footholds in neighborhoods
and communities where traditional competitors are barred. 238 Similarly, most U.S.
cities are designed with car travel in mind. 239 Uber and Lyft thrive in these
communities in part because the infrastructure favors their business model,
whereas many bikeshare services struggle because roads are often not designed
with cyclists in mind—and even when they are, the needs of cars often come first. 240
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As Rosenbarger describes it, the key is to understand how infrastructure
systems influence consumer choices. 241 With that information, cities can make
changes that nudge—or sometimes shove—consumers in the sharing economy to act
in ways that advance community goals. 242 In the cases of rideshares and bikeshares,
infrastructure considerations include designs of streets, parking, sidewalks, transit
routes, and land use, among several other factors. 243 Problematically, even minor
changes in policy and infrastructure can be difficult to secure because of costs or a
lack of political will. 244
Again, focusing on Bloomington, the city faces challenging hurdles in
ensuring public safety with electric scooter use. First, securing usable data from
Bird and Lime has been frustrating to a certain degree. 245 While the companies are
willing to share information with the city—sometimes in real time—it comes in
bulk, and the numbers are not easy to interpret. 246 Once organized into a standard
reporting format, the city government would ideally wish to share the information
with the public to foster informed debate about proposed ordinances. However,
much of the data provided potentially falls under trade secret protections, even
information as seemingly innocuous as how many, when, and where scooters are
deployed because the data could be employed by rival companies to erase some
competitive edge. 247
Putting that concern aside, the cost of regulatory action is often more than
cash-strapped cities and towns can afford. As previously discussed, existing Indiana
state laws regarding motorcycle and bicycle helmet use make it difficult to pass any
law requiring electric scooters riders to wear helmets. 248 However, even if
Bloomington felt it could pass such an ordinance, enforcing it would be virtually
impossible. 249 The cost in terms of human effort would be too great. 250 Indeed, some
of the impetus for passing the recent ordinance to allow bicycle use on sidewalks
was because the city faced similar limitations enforcing the prohibition. 251
Other times, cost complications are compounded by political realities. For
instance, a serious public safety concern about electric scooters is the haphazard
nature in which they are parked. 252 Bloomington thus considered establishing
dedicated parking zones, particularly downtown, to minimize tripping hazards for
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pedestrians and ensure compliance with ADA regulations regarding sidewalk
space. 253 Again, however, the cost of regulation is a problem. Much like helmet laws,
the police would be hard-pressed to enforce an electric scooter parking ordinance. 254
On top of that concern lies another: Where would the city put dedicated
scooter parking? Streets, alleyways, and sidewalks are not viable options as the goal
is to clear parked scooters from these areas. The most viable option would be
converting existing street-parking car spaces to electric scooter parking zones. But
in Bloomington, like many towns, street parking for cars is already a sparse
premium, and residents are unlikely to back such legislative action. 255
In the end, the capacity of government at any level to regulate elements of
the sharing economy depends on the will of the citizenry. However, because every
legislative act comes with built-in tradeoffs—some known, some unknown—
measures are often extremely difficult to pass or simply dead on arrival. The issue
of climate change presents a good example. According to a Pew Research Center
report, two-thirds of Americans feel the federal government is not doing enough to
reduce the negative impacts of climate change, and sixty-three percent say they are
willing to bear increased costs to address this issue. 256 While local data is sparse,
given the partisan divide on climate change 257 and Bloomington’s record of liberal
voting patterns, 258 one could reasonably assume Bloomington residents at least
match, if not outpace, the national numbers. 259 Mayor John Hamilton, thus, felt
comfortable proposing a plan to create a sustainability investment fund for the city
and county that will be financed by increasing income taxes half a percent,
resulting in $16 million added annually to the fund. 260 Considering that Monroe
County taxes are the twenty-second lowest of the ninety-two counties in the state,
the tax increase seemed justifiable. 261 The measure received immense blowback,

253
254
255

256

257
258

259
260

261

Id.
Id.; Bicyclists and Pedestrians, supra note 188.
See generally DESMAN DESIGN MGMT., DOWNTOWN AREA PARKING STUDY: BLOOMINGTON, IN (2018),
https://bloomington.in.gov/sites/default/files/2020-06/Bloomington%20Final%20Report%206.21.18Downtown%20Parking%20Study.pdf.
Cary Funk & Brian Kennedy, How Americans See Climate Change and the Environment in Seven Charts,
PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 21, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/04/21/how-americans-seeclimate-change-and-the-environment-in-7-charts/.
Id.
See Ernest Rollins, Dems Sweep Races for Monroe County Posts; Hennessey Tops Wanzer in MCCSC
Contest, HERALD-TIMES (Nov. 4, 2020),
https://www.hoosiertimes.com/herald_times_online/news/elections/dems-sweep-races-for-monroe-countyposts-hennessey-tops-wanzer-in-mccsc-contest/article_9a86bac6-1e57-11eb-b9f2-97fb96f6faac.html.
See 2017 U.S. Party Affiliation by State, GALLUP, https://news.gallup.com/poll/226643/2017-party-affiliationstate.aspx (last visited Sept. 7, 2020).
Joey Bowling, Bloomington Mayor, Environmental Experts Discuss Proposed Income Tax Increase, IND.
DAILY STUDENT (Mar. 5, 2020, 11:19 PM), https://www.idsnews.com/article/2020/03/bloomington-mayorenvironmental-experts-discuss-proposed-income-tax-increase.
Id.

2021]

What Is Shared in the Sharing Economy?

51

some from conservative groups who oppose virtually any new tax, 262 but much
criticism was levied by those who agree with the principle of climate protections but
feel the increased tax burden unnecessary, unfeasible, or poorly structured. 263 The
proposal ultimately failed. 264
Curbing the negative impacts of the gig economy is likely to result in similar
tradeoffs. It is easy to see and complain about the undue financial burden placed on
rideshare drivers because of low wages and no access to benefits because of their
independent contractor status; 265 the social inequalities created by the lack of
affordable housing, which are proliferated by expanded Airbnb listings; 266 or the
dangers faced by pedestrians sharing sidewalks with speeding, or even parked,
scooters. 267 However, to correct these injustices visited upon some may require
sacrifice from all. Are we willing to expand Obamacare to cover gig workers? Are we
willing to sacrifice some agency in how we use our own properties—or perhaps even
regulate how many we might own within a given area? Are we willing to forfeit
parking spaces to ensure clear sidewalks?
Regulation can and should internalize some negative externalities visited
upon us by platforms operating in the sharing economy, but it is a fantasy to
assume full containment within set systems. At some level we have to recognize our
ability to correct injustices and social inequalities both as individuals and members
of the broader electorate. Collectively, we have been willing to sacrifice much of our
search, seizure, and privacy rights for the convenience of accessing a litany of
internet platforms. The million-dollar question, then, is this: Will we be similarly
willing to sacrifice the more fundamental rights of health, safety, and dignity of
many of our fellow citizens, or will we act in accordance with our conscience and our
founding principles? Harkening, yet again, back to Orwell, it is a hard truth that in
America, some animals have always been more equal than others, 268 but much of
our historical arc has embodied an effort to close that gap, albeit ever so slowly.
Hopefully, we will allow “the better angels of our nature” to prevail. 269
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